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On the surface, four features characterise the current ‘full employment’ labour market of the
Netherlands: a high incidence of part-time jobs; widespread use of temporary agency and
flextime work; low registered unemployment; and a high disability rate. Part-time jobs have
become the dominant transitional arrangement between education and employment for young
people entering the labour force, and between domestic activities and employment, especially
for women. Temporary agency work is used by young people, school leavers and students
entering employment, and as a transitional arrangement from unemployment to employment.
The unemployment rate, after reaching double-digit figures in the 1980s and still over seven
percent in 1995, dropped to 2.5 percent in early 2001, the lowest rate since 1972. This good
news is accompanied by strong job growth, almost two percent per year since 1983 and
outpacing labour force growth by a wide margin. From 1975 to 1999 the participation rate of
women between 15-65 years doubled from 30 to 60 percent. Older males, on the other hand,
have increasingly disappeared from the labour market. The participation rate of men aged
between 50 and 65 years dropped from 85 to 60 percent. The employment ratio of the 55-64
age group, men and women, was as low as 29 percent in 1993, but has risen since. The high
disablement rate, 952,000 persons at the end of 2000 or twelve percent of the labour force,
remains a sour spot in the Dutch welfare state. Disablement indicates a near irreversible and
exclusionary transition from employment into non-employment, currently involving a
growing number of younger people and women, with a strong incidence of stress-related
complaints.
In this paper I intend to analyse the Dutch labour market from the perspective of working
time arrangements and ‘flexicurity’ regulation, making use of the concept of transitional
labour markets (Schmid 1998; Schmid and Gazier 2001). Transitional labour markets can be
regarded as institutional responses to critical events in labour markets: entry, exit, job change,
unemployment, and non-employment connected with non-paid activities and responsibilities.
Integrative or ‘good’ transitional labour markets require institutional arrangements that allow
or support entry into employment, mobility between jobs, life-course management of
employment, including the combination of paid work in the formal labour market with other
socially useful activities, including education and caring. It has been argued that working-
time arrangements can play an important role in easing such transitions or mobility stages in
current labour markets (Cebríán, Lallement and O’Reilly 2000).
In the next pages I shall examine to what extent this is true for the Dutch labour market of
recent times, proceeding in five steps. Paragraph 1 offers a brief discussion of the
classification of labour market transitions and working-time arrangements, and of the
hypothetical relations between them, that will then be taken as the basis for my empirical
investigation. Paragraphs 2 and 3 offer some descriptive statistics of the various transitions
and working-time arrangements in the Dutch labour market. In paragraph 4 this is followed
by a discussion of the regulatory regime of Dutch industrial relations combined with a brief
description of the main institutions, actors and processes. Paragraph 5 discusses in greater
detail the various steps towards ‘flexicurity’ and ‘negotiated flexibility’ in working-time
arrangements, from the Wassenaar agreement of 1982 to the recent ‘Work and Care’ bill of
2001. Paragraph 6, finally, tries an evaluation of the strength and weakness of the Dutch3
approach of recent times.
I. Processes, transitions and working time arrangement.
We can distinguish five types of transitions or mobility in modern labour markets: (i) between
education and employment; (ii) between non-employment and employment; (iii) between
unemployment and employment; (iv) within employment, between jobs, or between
dependent and self-employment; (v) between employment and retirement (see: Schmid 1998).
Each of these can be conceived of as a two-way process. While we mostly see i as a
movement from school to work, in a perspective of life-long learning the reverse may become
increasingly relevant. Similarly, we need not think of retirement as a final stage in all
circumstances.
Cebríán, Lallement and O’Reilly (2000) have proposed a distinction between integrative,
maintenance and exclusionary transitions. Integrative transitions refer to people who were
initially outside paid employment, either being unemployed (iii) or outside the labour force,
perhaps as ‘discouraged workers’ (ii), or enrolled in education or training schemes (i).
Maintenance transitions enhance what is sometimes called ‘employability’ or employment
(rather than job) security. Transitions of this type are the mobility processes (iv) between
different jobs, employers or employment statuses, possibly alternating with phases of
education (i) or other socially useful activities (ii), but avoiding unemployment (iii) and early
withdrawal or disablement (v). Exclusionary transitions, on the other hand, lead to withdrawal
(v), possibly preceded by an extended period of unemployment, sickness or non-employment
interrupted by brief spells of temporary or part-time employment. The latter definition
suggests that processes of social integration, exclusion and maintenance in labour markets are
closely intertwined with working time arrangements.
Flexibility has different sources and motives, and involves the dimensions of time, contract,
task, and pay (Atkinson 1987; Esping-Andersen and Regini 2000; Streeck 1987). In this
chapter the emphasis is on numerical flexibility, i.e. the ease with which working hours
and/or the number of workers can be adapted to meet fluctuations in demand or supply shifts
related to technological and social change. Within numerical flexibility two further useful
distinctions are between internal and external flexibility (de Haan, Vos and de Jong 1994),
and between active and passive flexibility (Passchier and Sprenger 1998). When firms solve
the problem of adaptation to varying demand internally, by expanding or contracting the
number of working hours, or through a more variable use of labour, we speak of internal
flexibility. When they approach the problem through hiring or laying off workers, or by hiring
‘contingent workers’ on short-duration or ‘call’ contracts, we have external flexibility. Active
and passive flexibility refer to the position of employees in the choice of contracts and
working hours. When employees work flexible hours or work under flexible contracts
involuntarily, because alternatives are lacking, flexibility is imposed and passive from the
workers’ point of view. Active flexibility is voluntary and tends to reflect workers’
preferences for risk taking, variable hours and combination of employment with other
activities.
Two well-known forms of external flexibility are temp workers employed by temporary work4
agencies (TWA) and workers on temporary or fixed duration contracts (FlexC) without the
prospect or promise of a regular (‘open ended’) employment contract. Specific and sometimes
hazardous forms of FlexC are workers ‘on call’, temporary replacements or ‘stand-ins’, and
contracts with unspecified but variable hours and earnings, like ‘zero-hours’ and ‘min-max’
employment contracts. Further forms of external numerical flexibility involve ‘home work’,
seasonal and vacation jobs, some forms of self-employment and some types of ‘labour pools’.
Internal flexibility relates to increased variation in working hours and flexible working-time
arrangements of regular workers who are employed on the basis of standard, full- time or
part-time, employment contracts. Compared to external flexibility, workers need be less
uncertain about the continuation of employment and earnings, whereas employers have less to
worry about the availability or quality of staff. In this paper I distinguish eight relevant
working-time arrangements: part-time work (PT); variable working hours or annual (and
lifetime) working accounts (VarH); work in shifts (shift), so-called ‘unsocial’ working hours
during evenings, nights and weekends (24H); overtime (OT); temporary reduced hours
(TRH); shorter working hours (SWH) and leave of absence (LEAVE). Table 1 locates these
forms in a two-dimensional space defined by the two axes of flexibility and suggests which
groups will be most affected by these forms of flexibility.
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Part-time, overtime, temporary reduced and shorter worker hours are defined on the basis of
some norm referring to the normal, contractual or average length of the working day or week;
variable hours or flex-time refers not to the length but to the variation in working hours
during the day, week, month or year; shift-work to monthly or weekly changing working
hours involving evenings, nights and/or weekends, 24-hours regimes to regular work
involving any time during the day or week (24H); and leave of absence to interruptions from
paid employment into non-employment, education or retirement while retaining employment
status. All these categories need further refinement.
Various classifications of part-time jobs have been proposed, mostly based on the length and
stability of these jobs, and intended to separate marginal part-time jobs from their more5
gratifying and sustainable variants (Hakim 1996; 1997; O’Reilly and Fagan 1998). Thus, it
would seem meaningful to distinguish small part-time jobs (for instance, less than 12, 15 or
20 hours weekly) from part-time jobs that involve half-time employment or more. Overtime,
especially when leading to a regular call to put in long hours, is the opposite of part-time
work. Shorter working hours refers here to the collective variant of working-time reduction
below the contractual norm of 40 weekly hours on average, whereas temporary reduced
working hours refers to the possibility to combine unemployment and employment during a
limited period of crisis or restructuring, usually with support from unemployment insurance
funds. Under variable working hours we may group a variety of arrangements, from
annualised working hours, allowing variation of daily or weekly working hours schedules
during the year, as well as life time (or time saving) accounts. Finally, there is also a great
variety of leave arrangements in terms of what motivates a particular leave, its length,
recurrence, entitlement and pay.
With regard to all types of numerical flexibility distinguished above, it is important to know
how the decision to work a particular contact, number of hours or working-time schedule is
framed by regulations; who takes the initiative or to what extent do arrangements reflect
worker preferences; how the advantages and disadvantages are weighted or compensated; and
how easy or difficult it is to change between arrangements. In addition to micro-social
rationality, we may question the aggregate rationale of certain regimes of flexibility, from the
point of view of overall economic performance or social justice. I will return to these
questions in my evaluation at the end of the chapter. Table 2 summarises the proposed
typologies by suggesting a set of hypothetical linkages between labour market transitions and
working-time arrangements.
Table 2: Hypothetical relationships between working-time arrangements (internal flexibility) and labour
 market transitions
social processes labour market transitions facilitated by the following
working time arrangements
INTEGRATION
(i) education to employment
(ii) non-employment to employment





(iv) employment to employment
(i) employment with education
(ii) employment with non-employment
(iii) employment with unemployment
(iv) employment with retirement
Leave, SWH
Leave, PT, SWH, ^OT
Leave, PT, SWH, FlexH, 24H, ^OT
TRH
PT, ^FLEX, ^Shift, ^OT
prevention of
EXCLUSION
(v) employment to retirement
(iii) employment to unemployment
(ii) employment to non-employment
Leave, SWH, PT, ^Shift, ^FlexH
TRH, SWH, ^PTsmall
Leave, PT, ^Shift, ^OT, ^PTsmall
Legend: PT=part-time work; OT=overtime; SWH=shorter working hours; TRH=temporary reduced hours; FLEX=variable hours (flex-
time); 24H=evening, night and weekend hours; Shift=shift work; and Leave=leave of absence arrangements. ^PT = non-part-time, i.e. the6
part-time option is not available, etc.
II. The Dutch Labour Market in the 1990s
We can approach the various transitional stages in the Dutch labour market from the data in
Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 confirms the growth of the labour force during the 1990s with 1
million and of the employed labour force with 1,2 million persons, raising the
employment/population ratio by one percentage point per year. Almost 70 percent of this rise
was due to the influx of women in the labour force. Unemployment, on the rise again in the
recession of 1993-94, has since halved in the case of men, and decreased strongly in the case
of women.
Table 3: Labour and non-labour force, by sex, 1990-1999
1990 1995 1999 1990 1995 1999
TOTAL x1000
of whom in education
working age population 10,228 10,498 10,663 2,114 19.8% participation rates
labour force (>12 hours) 6,063 6,596 7,097 906 12.8% 59 63 67
1. employed 5,644 6,063 6,805 823 12.1% 55 58 64
unemployment rate
2. unemployed 419 533 292 83 28.4% 6.9 8.1 4.1
3. non-labour force 4,165 3,903 3,566 1,209 33.9% involved in paid work
with small job (<12 hours) 690 712 796 16.6% 18.2% 22.3%
with disablement pension 863 877 914 20.7% 22.5% 25.6%
with pre-retirement pension 128 152 130 3.1% 3.9% 3.6%
MALE
working age population 5,182 5,329 5,400 1,126 20.9% participation rates
labour force (>12 hours) 3,865 4,067 4,242 546 12.9% 75 76 79
1. employed 3,686 3,814 4,121 504 12.2% 71 72 76
unemployment rate
2. unemployed 179 253 118 42 35.6% 4.6 6.2 2.8
3. non-labour force, 1,317 1,262 1,151 580 50.1% involved in paid work
with small job (<12 hours) 236 242 279 17.9% 19.2% 24.1%
with disablement pension 590 587 .. 44.8% 44.6% ..
with. pre-retirement pension 107 126 .. 9.5% 11.9% ..
FEMALE
working age population 5,046 5,169 5,263 989 18.8% participation rates
labour force (>12 hours) 2,198 2,529 2,856 359 12.6% 43 49 54
1. employed 1,958 2,249 2,684 319 11.9% 39 44 51
unemployment rate
2. unemployed 240 281 174 41 23.6% 10.9 11.1 6.1
3. non-labour force 2,849 2,640 2,408 629 26.1% involved in paid work
with small job (<12 hours) 454 470 517 15.9% 17.8% 21.5%
with disablement pension 273 314 .. 9.6% 11.9% ..
with pre-retirement pension 20 26 .. 0.7% 1.0% ..
Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), The Hague, various publications and STATline (http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb)7
Considering the 1999 data, we observe that of the 10,7 million working age population (15-65
years), 7,1 million belong to the labour force and 3,6 million persons are defined outside the
labour force when we apply the criterion of working or wanting to work at least twelve hours
per week on a regular basis.
1 One-third (33.9%) of the non-labour force is enrolled in
education; one-quarter (26%) receives a disablement pension, another quarter (22%) works in
marginal jobs of less than twelve hours weekly, and 3.6% receive a pre-retirement benefit.
The remainder receive social assistance, are not registered, perhaps discouraged from looking
for a job or not available to accept a job on short notice, in education or on household duty.
Of the female non-labour force, around half is (self-)defined as housewife and among females
enrolment in education and entitlement to social benefits is much smaller than in the male
non-labour force, whereas the incidence of marginal part-time jobs is higher.
From Table 3 we can deduce that the borderlines between the various subsystems –
employment, education, social security – are porous. Half of all people in education are
employed, reflecting both the growing importance of adult education and formal job
retraining, and the rise of student work since the late 1980s. In 1998 46 percent of school
going youth and students under the age of 25 had a (part-time) job (de Beer 2000). Twelve
percent of the employed labour force (in non-marginal jobs) is enrolled in (part-time) schools;
among the unemployed this proportion rises to 28 percent (36% for men and 24% for
women), possibly due to the new active labour market policy in which job seekers are offered
training. Of the 914,000 people receiving disablement pensions in 1999, more than a quarter
was partially disabled, possibly in combination with employment, unemployment and
education, or support from social assistance, families or partners.
Having been used as the ‘velvet exit route’ from the labour market for older (male, industrial)
workers in the 1970s and 1980s (see Aarts and de Jong 1996), the current system is rapidly
feminising. Half of the 100,000 disablement pensions starting in 2000 went to women, far in
excess of their share in employment. One-third of these disablement pensions, starting after
one year of absence due to sickness, were awarded on grounds of ‘psychological
dysfunctioning or stress’. Another disquieting factor is that nearly half of all new cases of
disability affected people under 45 years. Of the 75,000 people whose disability pension was
stopped, only a minority was reintegrated into (part-time) employment. 40 percent reached the
official retirement age of 65, a small number died, and others were transferred to social
assistance.
2 On the current rate of increase the number of people of disability pensions will
surpass the 1 million threshold in 2003, a figure that ten years ago alarmed politicians in
drastic actions. However, the painful reforms of 1993 and later years, which reduced the
Labour party nearly into opposition during the 1994 elections, did bring only temporary relief.
Due to lower benefits, stricter selection, penalties for employers and medical re-examinations,
the number of pensions dropped by almost 100,000 between 1993 and 1996, but starting
again on its long-term upward trend. In typical Dutch ‘consociationalism cum corporatism’
fashion, an all-party committee, with membership from government and opposition parties,
                                                     
1 Smaller jobs are not observed by the Dutch labour force survey (Enquète Beroepsbevolking, or EBB,
conducted by the Central Statistical Bureau, or CBS) and our knowledge of these jobs is based on other sources,
like enterprise surveys.
2 Data from the 2000 Annual report of the National Institute for Social Insurance (Landelijk Instituut voor
Sociale Verzekeringen, LISV)8
and closed door negotiations with unions and employers, has in May 2001 proposed another
major overhaul of the system, making a sharper distinction between full and irreversible
disability on the one hand and partial and curable disability on the other. The committee
proposes to improve the social care for the first group and to strengthen the incentives for
employers and workers to invest in health recovery, job search and employment for the
second group.
Finally, from Table 4 we learn that unemployment may be defined in different ways and
include people who are currently defined outside the labour market or enrolled in (full-time)
education. The indicators of long-term unemployment (since the mid-1980s roughly half of
all unemployed are unemployed during one year or longer) and of an ill-defined ‘labour
reserve’ (some 700,000 or double the official number of unemployed want to work but may
not be available to work twelve or more hours per week) suggest that, in spite of the sharp
drop in unemployment in recent years, the transition out of unemployment and non-
employment is problematic still for many people. The problem is mostly concentrated among
those who have been unemployed for a long time and among ethnic minorities. Women with
responsibilities for young children, especially when lone parent and unskilled, have great
difficulty entering the job market or retain any but a small part-time job with no financial
sustainability or job qualifying promise. The 1996 reform of the social assistance laws limited
the exemption from (part-time) job search to lone parents with children under the age of five
(the prior age limit was twelve). Older unemployed workers, mostly males of 57,5 years and
more, have since 1984 been exempted from the requirement to engage in job search, without
jeopardising their benefits under unemployment insurance and social assistance laws (though
this exemption is currently under review).
Table 4: Indicators of unemployment, 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
registered unemployment 336 415 486 464 440 375 287 221 188
of whom >= 1 year 49.1% 45.3% 50.2% 53.2% 50.2% 52.0% 54.0% 50.2% 43,6%
unemployment benefits 214 386 355 306 249 204
unemployed labour force 411 481 547 533 494 438 348 292 267
wants to work (>= 12 hours) 974 1,117 1,020 914 805 700
social assistance recipients 214 386 355 306 249 204
unemployment. rate (registered) 5.3 6.5 7.5 7.0 6.6 5.5 4.1 3.1 2.6
unemployment rate
(labour force)
6.5 7.5 8.5 8.1 7.4 6.4 5.0 4.1 3.7
source: Central Statistical Office (CBS), press release of 17-5-2001, and historical series (http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb).
Studies of mobility, worker turnover and flows into and out employment and unemployment
offer the following picture of the Dutch labour market in the 1990s. From panel data, Hartog
and Theeuwes (1997) estimate that on average fifteen percent of workers, almost one in
seven, change jobs annually, a figure that compares well other OECD countries. Panel data of
the Organisation of Strategic Labour Market Research
3 show that eleven percent of all
                                                     
3 Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek (OSA), annual panel on demand and supply of labour,
among a representative sample of enterprises and workers.9
workers changed jobs while remaining with the same employer (OSA data, cited in De Lange
and Thunissen 2000). Functional flexibility, or the degree to which workers perform tasks
‘outside their function, occupation or skill-level’, appears to have increased from an average
13-14 percent between 1985 and 1994 to over 17 percent in 1998. This increase is observed
across a variety of occupations and suggests that, in a tightening labour market, employers
prefer workers with broader skill profiles as an alternative to numerical (and short-time)
flexibility. Numerical flexibility is more prominent in small firms, under 99 employees,
which together employ about half of the Dutch work force. In terms of employees involved,
functional and numerical flexibility are equally important in larger firms (de Lange and
Thunissen 2000).
Labour mobility, or change of employer, moves in a cyclical pattern; it decreases during
recessions and rises when labour markets are tight. Around six percent of all workers changed
their employer in 1998, about the same proportion as in 1991, whereas less than four percent
did so in the recession year 1994.
4 Incidentally, these figures neither indicate a strong rise in
‘job hopping’, nor do they signal ‘the end of the career’ for the majority of workers. In spite
of the rise in flexible employment contracts (see below), the mean job duration, of people
remaining with the same employer, has increased with a full year, from 8.4 years in 1992 to
9.4 years in 1998.
5 Women have, on average, three years less tenure than men. This reflects,
in part the younger age structure of the female labour force due to lower participation of older
cohorts. Average job duration of employees between 15-24 years is 1.8 years; increasing to
7.6 years for employees aged 25-44 and 16.0 years for employees aged 45-65. Age and sex
differences in job tenure are larger than in countries like Austria, Denmark and Ireland
(OECD figures, cited in Rubery 2001).
Employment growth is the balance of relatively large flows of job creation and destruction.
For instance, the increase with 60,000 jobs in 1992 (+2.2%) was the sum of 240,000 new jobs
(+15.2%) and the destruction of 180,000 jobs (-13.0%). Hassink (1995), on the basis of panel
data for 1990, estimated an average annual inflow with new workers of around 11-12 percent.
Micro-census data from the Dutch Central Statistical Office (CBS 1998) suggest a steady rise
of inflow into employment – from education, unemployment and non-employment – from
less than 13 percent before 1994 to 16 percent in later years, a pattern that is consistent with
rising job growth during the decade. Gautier (1997), using administrative social security data,
has computed a historical time series for 1970-91, both with regard to the outflow from
employment into unemployment and non-employment, and the inflow into employment from
unemployment and non-employment. His figures show that inflow collapsed and outflow
soared during the recession of 1981-83. After 1983 inflow was on a steady rise, whereas
during employment outflow stabilised at a significantly higher level in the 1980s than in the
previous decade, due to increased exits through unemployment, disablement and early
retirement. During the 1980s outflow from unemployment into employment decreased and
unemployment became hardened into long-term unemployment for a significant part of the
(older, unskilled and ethnic minority) population (De Beer 1996; Krogt et al. 1990). In the
1980s seven out of eight new jobs went to new entrants or re-entrants (youth and women) (see
Visser and Hemerijck 1997, chapter 2, and sources cited there). A study by Russo et al.
                                                     
4 CBS, Labour Force Survey (EBB) data.
5 Idem.10
(1997) confirms that newly acquired skills and educational requirements may be decisive.
Their analysis of the 1991-94 period showed that employers, when interested in higher
educational standards, tend to hire from the stock of employed. In contrast, recruitment of
unemployed workers tends to go with lowering standards. That study took place during a
downturn and it may be that in today’s tight labour markets employers cannot afford being
choosy to the same extent.
Together, increased job tenure and high job turnover may point to a growing polarisation of
the labour force, with some groups (new entrants, re-entering and part-time working women,
people with low skills, unemployed) being sorted into highly unstable jobs while (male)
insiders hold on to stable and full-time jobs. This is indeed the picture that, at least in the late
1980s, seemed to fit the Dutch case (Lindeboom and Theeuwes 1991). It is hard to say how
much has changed in the 1990s. We know that until 1997 or 1998 most of the Dutch
employment miracle was due to the expansion of part-time and flexible jobs filled by women
and youth. After 1998 this type of expansion, emptying the reservoir of unused labour, seems
to have exhausted, which explains why unemployment has fallen so much and is still falling
in early 2001, in spite of faltering economic growth. More new entrants are offered a standard
employment contract (with a one or two months trial period) than has been the case only few
years ago, indicating the effect of a tightening labour market. More telling, from the
perspective of overcoming polarisation and the prevention of social exclusion, is that almost
half (47%) of all persons who in 1994 were employed under flexible contracts had a
permanent job two years later. Of those with flexible jobs in 1996 (a larger group than in
1994), 57 percent had a permanent job in 1998. Transitions out of unemployment into
permanent jobs (or jobs with the prospect of permanent employment, after completion of the
trial period) also increased. 22 percent of those unemployed in 1994 had found a permanent
job two years later, rising to 33 percent in 1998 of those unemployed in 1996.
6
These figures, apart from reflecting an improved labour market, suggest that large streams of
people – perhaps one-third of the labour force each year, counting all transitions distinguished
in Table 2 - are in transitional labour markets each year.  From that perspective, it is hard to
sustain that the Dutch labour market is lacking in mobility. On the negative side, however, we
find people who remain in insecure transitional labour markets despite themselves, for
instance because they fail to move out of (long-term) unemployment for lack of skills or
preparation, or because they move from one badly protected flexible job to another for
reasons of (partial) disability, dropout from education or lack of support in, for instance, the
case of lone mothers. Before returning to these issues in the paragraph on policies, I shall
survey the flexible contract and time arrangements distinguished in Tables 1 and 2 and
discuss their use in transitional labour markets.
III. Flexible contracts and working-time arrangements in the 1990s
The size of the market for flexible work has increased and may be larger in the Netherlands
than in many other countries—the selection in Table 5 is chosen so as to represent countries
with widely different industrial relations and welfare state systems, ranging from liberal-
pluralist (US, UK), to conservative-familialist (Spain), corporatist (Germany) and social
                                                     
6 Data from the Regional Labour Market Boards (Regionale Organisatie voor de Arbeidsmarkt, or ROA).11
democratic (Denmark) (see Crouch 1993; Esping-Andersen 1990; Van Ruysseveldt and
Visser 1996; Visser 2001). Not only has the Netherlands become the champion of part-time
work, but in TWA jobs the Netherlands holds the world’s record as well. In the 1990s the
market share of TWA’s doubled from two to four percent (Dunnewijk 2000). With regard to
flexible jobs or fixed duration contracts (FlexC), the Netherlands occupies a middle position.
The OECD (1998) ranks the Netherlands as most rigid in terms of employment protection
(EP)
7, but this reflects legal rules rather than actual procedure, which is more flexible (Bertola
1990; Mayes and Soteri 1994; Wilthagen 1998). Temporary contracts tend to develop as a by-
pass, around strict EP, as appears to be demonstrated by the case of Spain. Conversely, where
EP is weak, as is the case in the US and the UK, there appears little need for additional
flexibility. This makes the Netherlands, with strong job growth and additional flexibility
through TWA and part-time jobs
8, but with an average use of flex-contracts, a somewhat odd
case if one believes the OECD ranking of the Netherlands as highly rigid in its system of
employment protection (for a critique: Nickell and Layard 1999).
Table 5: Part-time, Flexible and Temporary agency work in selected countries
part-time a) flexible jobs b) TWA 1998 e) EP f)
















Netherlands 21.2 30.4 8.0 12.0 <25 7-12 4.50 13,300 3.1 25
Denmark 23.8  17.9 12.5 11.0 <25 7-12 0.25 1,100 1.6 7
Germany 12.6 17.1 10.0 11.0 <25 25-36 0.50 1,600 2.8 21
Spain 5.0 7.9 11.0 24.0 25-49 4-6 0.75 2,800 2.6 18
UK 19.0 23.0 7.0 7.5 25-49 7-12 3.00 3,500 0.8 2
US 18.4  18.3 d) 0.5 d) 1.9 .. .. 2.25 8,400 0.2 1
a)  OECD, Employment Outlook 2 000, restricted definition (van Bastelaer et al 1997):  less than 30 hours weekly and (in the Dutch case)
more than 11 hours weekly.
b) OECD Employment Outlook 1998, jobs based on employment contracts of determinate length (in the Netherlands usually less than one
year).
c) based on ELFS data for 1998, Eurostat, European Labour Force Survey 1998.
d) US figures (not strictly comparable) from NATS, the National Association of Temporary Staffing.
e) TWA-figures provided by CIETT, the International Confederation of Temporary Work Businesses. The figures refer to daily averages of
working hours worked though temporary work agencies, as a percentage of man-hours worked.
f) OECD, ‘Employment protection and labour market performance’, Paris 2000
Not shown in Table 5 is the development of flexible time use, offering greater variation in the
use of labour but within standard labour contracts and with less uncertainty and variation of
earnings. That development will be discussed shortly. Also outside Table 5, but an additional
source of flexibility, is the development of new forms of self-employment, of those working
in a sub-contracting rather than in an employment relationship. Self-employment has risen
with some 150,000 persons to over 750,000 in 1998, representing a stable share in total
employment of about twelve percent since the 1980s. Of these at most one-quarter, or three
                                                     
7 A measure that incorporates the difficulty of dismissal, notice, severance pay, and inconveniences of procedure,
see OECD 1998.
8 However, in combination with insufficient childcare and with narrowly fixed schedules in education, women
working part-time may be less rather than more time-flexible compared to, for instance, full-time working men
who may be eager and willing to work overtime hours.12
percent of total employment, are self-employed in a subcontracting relationship, avoiding
social security contributions and not covered by standard labour law and social protection
pertaining to employees. In recent years a growing number of construction workers, truckers,
computer specialists, health therapists, hairdressers and beauty specialists have swelled the
ranks of the self-employed, joining the usual suspects of freelance workers among journalists,
artists and professionals.
The transition from employee status to self-employment may produce a ‘regulation gap’ with
regard to pensions and social security coverage, with exclusionary consequences due to
under-insurance in the future. According to union research just over 70 percent of self-
employed truckers and construction workers, but only 20 percent of free-lance journalists, are
fully insured against the risk of disability or sickness, guaranteeing an earnings-related benefit
(Ilpenburg 2000). Insurance, guaranteeing 70 percent of last-earned wages in the case of full
disability, is compulsory in the case of employees and most collective agreements since 1993,
when the state lowered protection, provide additional insurance.
Table 6: External flexibility, by type of contract (in thousands), 1992-1999
flexible contracts TWA call-contracts stand-in other
1992 399 102 78 39 181
1993 393 98 79 36 179
1994 425 114 91 36 185
1995 477 149 105 34 189
1996 538 187 114 48 188
1997 566 207 121 43 195
1998 604 223 138 49 195
1999 571 210 112 44 205
source: same as Table 2
Table 6 shows a rising trend in external flexibility during the 1990s. Numerical flexibility
based on flexible employment contracts, has increased from 12 to 17 percent of all jobs
during the 1990s, and involves around fourteen or fifteen percent of all employed persons, or
twelve percent if we exclude young people, students and re-entering women with small jobs
of less than 12 hours per week. These estimates refer to formal employment relations. Given
the low threshold of hours and the rather encompassing regime of social security, there is no
reason to believe that informal labour other than ‘do-it-yourself’, household cleaning and
family help (including care for children and elderly people) is very widespread in the
Netherlands. A high degree of flexibility and low thresholds for entry into the labour market
and into social insurance tend to compress the market for informal employment (Delsen
1988).
--Temporary Work Agencies
TWA jobs (in Dutch: uitzendwerk) are used in agriculture and industry in case of seasonal
work or uncertain demand, and in services in case of temporary activities. Typically, TWA
workers are young, without children; there are in fact many starting dual earner households
involved in this kind of jobs. Traditionally, TWA’s have specialised in buffering fluctuation,
matching product demand changes and labour supply, for instance in the case of seasonal
fluctuation or temporary replacements, but they are also used by employers to avoid dismissal13
protection requirements and as a screening device. On the supply side, TWA’s have picked up
the desire for more autonomy in matters of working hours, education and leisure of people in
transitional labour markets, especially of young people and starting households.
TWA employment tends to expand cyclically. During recessions, TWA workers are the first
to loose their jobs by not being recalled; in the upswing product demand is first met with
extra effort (overtime) of existing employees as hoarding is reduced, followed by the hiring of
additional temp workers if future demand remains uncertain. If growth continues, temp work
tends to stabilise as some temp workers may be offered regular jobs.  Some of the larger
TWA’s operate on an international scale and are clearly moving ‘up market’ by specialising
in ‘human resource management’, training and employability of skilled workers (for instance
IT specialists and managers, or artists). TWA’s are also active in the market for subsidised or
additional employment and have made ‘contracts’ with local governments in the Netherlands
and Germany regarding the placement of the long-term unemployed, usually on the base of
lump sum subsidies.
--Temporary or fixed-duration contracts
Temporary jobs (arbeidscontracten voor bepaalde duur, also tijdelijk werk) involve slightly
more women than men, are usually found at the lowest skill and pay levels, and are mostly
filled by young people. Screening is only one of the reasons mentioned by employers for the
growth of temporary contracts (van Bolhuis 1996), other reasons are related to fluctuating and
uncertain demand. Tijdens (1999) associated the apparent increase of risk-avoidance to
employers’ attempts to increase long-term (internal, numerical and functional) flexibility
under an EP regime that makes it costly to dismiss workers (at least before the legal changes
of 1999). Changes in social security laws may have made employers more hesitant to start
hiring employees on the basis of standard employment contracts. Changes in sickness pay and
disability legislation in the mid-1990s have increased obligations on employers (Visser and
Hemerijck 1997) and may have made them intent on risk avoidance, though no sound
empirical research on this exists to date. Under the new ‘flexicurity’ legislation (1999),
employer responsibility and social insurance coverage has been widened to a larger category
of flexible and TWA workers.
-- Employment on call, temporary substitutes and unspecified hours
These are the least secure form of jobs, promising little sustainability of income and
employment, though somewhat better social security coverage after the legal changes of 1999.
Like some TWA jobs, these are the jobs with the largest variability in time schedules, which
may be changed from day to day and week to week. In seven out of ten jobs of this type we
find women (compared to four out of ten in total employment); mostly, these are married or
single mothers with children. Employment ‘on call’ (oproeparbeid) is in 85 percent of all
cases a job of less than 20 hours per week; unspecified hours contracts (nul-uren or zero-
hours and min-max contracts) are even smaller, whereas substitutes or stand-ins
(invalkrachten) are found in jobs of all lengths. Unspecified hours contracts are mostly used
in retailing and in hotels and restaurants; the other two types are also much used in the health
service and education. Employment ‘on call’ and unspecified hours contracts are used to
increase the (short-time) flexibility of firms which want to limit the size of the regular staff.
Surveys among these workers suggest a problematic ‘employment relation’ even though in 57
percent of all cases there is a written contract and in 90 percent a wage and tax slip is14
provided (hence, we are not referring to informal employment). Yet, research by the Ministry
of Social Affairs and Employment shows that most workers are poorly informed about their
wages, rights, holiday claims, and so forth (Tijdens 1999).
-- Flex-time employment and shorter working hours
Flex-time employment, variable and irregular hours, and longer opening hours became the
main issue in collective bargaining during the 1990s. This must be seen in the context of
growing fluctuation in demand, just-in-time production, increased (fixed) capital costs, longer
operating and shopping hours, traffic congestion, shorter working hours, more leisure time
and the pressures related to reconciling work and family responsibilities in a dual earner
society. A survey among firms shows that one of every two firms is confronted with some
kind of demand fluctuation. Sixty percent of the firms experiencing demand fluctuation
indicate that they prefer to deal with it through internal (time and job) flexibility; 16 percent
prefer external flexibility and 24 percent have no preference either way (de Jong and van
Bolhuis 1997). This preference of internal over external flexibility is shared by the trade
unions (Passchier and Sprenger 1998) and has become the basis for the central agreement of
1993 (‘New Course’) and new legislation on working time (1996).
Variable Hours
Annualisation of working hours and the concept of weekly or monthly average working hours
made its full entrance in the second half of the 1990s. As a consequence, employers can more
easily match working hours to changing demand conditions or shifting workloads, reducing
the likelihood of ‘overtime’ hours. In exchange, workers gained shorter working weeks, more
holidays or additional hourly pay, in some cases more autonomy over schedules. The main
union in industry introduced the concept of vari-time, allowing variable working hours over
the month or year but with guaranteed monthly and annual earnings. In many services and in
retailing employers wanted a better match of working hours and consumer behaviour, with
peak hours more often falling in evening hours or in weekends, and varying during the year,
with Christmas and holiday sales. The banking agreement, for instance, introduced a ‘corridor’
of working hours, between 32 and 40 hours, and exempted a large group (with scarce skills)
from the reduction. Furthermore, the agreement introduced longer ‘normal daytime’ working
hours, work on Saturday, lower overtime rates, and more variation during the year. Unions
gained stronger social clauses in case of work restructuring and protection of workers against
redundancies (Visser and Jongen 1999).
Unsocial Hours and Shift Work
According to the 1997 Labour Force Survey, excluding very small jobs of less than 12 hours
per week, around 43.3 of all employees work irregular hours (alternating evening and night
hours, including shift work: 14.4%; evening hours: 14.2%; weekend hours: 15.1%) (Visser
and Van Rij 1999). More recent figures suggest a significant rise in evening work during the
1990s (from 7.8% to 17.4% between 1992 and 1998 and a slight increase in work during
weekends (OECD 2000). Shift work is mainly found in industry; a high incidence of irregular
and unsocial hours is found in catering and entertainment (87% of all employees); transport
(66%); health; commerce; and agriculture (each 55%). With the exception of transport and
agriculture, these are sectors with an over-representation of women and young people.
However, women do not more often work in shifts or unsocial hours than men (they do work
shifts in different sectors however, e.g. in health rather than industry). Young people tend to15
work less in varying shifts but more during weekends, evenings and nights. Part-time workers
are not significantly more likely to work ‘unsocial’ hours; 48% of part-time workers,
compared to 51% of full-time workers, never work during evenings, nights or weekends (De
Beer 2000).
Shorter Working Hours
Since 1979 the Dutch trade unions began their campaign for a shorter working week  as a
means to combat rising unemployment through work sharing (de Lange 1988; Visser 1989).
Unlike the earlier movements towards shorter working hours—leading to the five-day
working week in 1962 and a standard 40 hours week for full-time workers in 1975—the
reduction of contractual working hours that took place in the 1980s and 1990s did not
produce convergence but divergence in working hours across society. Working hours
standards began to vary more than before, and the process of working time reduction itself
encouraged variations over the year, with a further fragmentation, and individualisation, of
working time schedules, including a boost of part-time employment (Visser 2000).
The bargaining rounds between 1983 and 1986, following the central agreement of
Wassenaar in November 1982, produced an average reduction of working hours by five
percent, from 40 to 38 hours per week for the majority of Dutch employees. In 1986 the
working week was reduced for 77 percent of all employees in the private sector. In addition to
measures promoting early retirement and more part-time jobs, the working-time reduction
took mostly the form of extra days off per year or per month and in most cases the reduction
of working time corresponded with a reduction of operating time (Tijdens 1998). Between
1986 and 1993 effective and contractual annual working hours of full-time and part-time
workers hardly changed. Only ten percent of all full-time workers had gained a 36 hours
working week by 1993, mainly in sectors or firms in which major restructuring and
manpower reduction had taken place (Tijdens, 1998).
In the wake of the 1993 recession, the unions revived their campaign for a 36 hours working
week. End 1993 they signed a major central agreement (‘New Course’) with the employers,
offering wage moderation in exchange for negotiations over shorter working hours while
introducing the possibility of increased flexibility in time-use and individual choice.
Negotiations proved difficult and in the bargaining rounds of 1994-95 and 1996-97 only half of
all employees covered by collective agreements reached a contractual working week of 36 hours
on average. Where the unions did succeed (e.g., Heineken, banking, department stores, health
and education, local and central government), variation in working hours across groups of
workers increased. In major industries and firms (e.g., Philips, metal engineering), employers
successfully resisted a further working time reduction and pressed for a return to 40 hours
working week instead. Similar pressures have emerged in the small firm sector and in the health
sector (with an contractual working week of 36 hours), where employers are faced with severe
recruitment problems. Compared to 1987, when male workers clearly exhibited two spikes of
working hours around 40 and 38 hours per week, the recent pattern show three spikes of 40, 38
and 36 hours, and longer left tail of male employees working part-time. Among female
employees there is no dominant pattern or spike, and the pattern has not much changed between
1987 and 1997  (Bosch 2001; OECD 2000).
Overtime Hours16
Given rising fixed costs, it is easy to predict that shorter working hours will increase the
pressure from employers to work more overtime hours. Where shorter working hours are not
(fully) compensated by higher hourly wages (as was the case in the Netherlands, where the
Wassenaar agreement had opened the door to ‘cost-neutral working-time reduction’ only),
some pressure to work overtime will also arise from insiders, especially men with
breadwinner responsibility. Case studies in the 1980s showed that staff shortages were
initially met by fixed-term contracts and, as predicted, an increase in the use of paid overtime
hours of permanent staff (de Lange 1988). Unpaid overtime hours, though more difficult to
gauge, probably increased also (and make up about half of the total number of overtime
hours, see Bosch 2001). Overtime hours decreased somewhat in the 1990s, partly as a
consequence of the recession but also on account of the annualisation and, hence, more
efficient use of labour time. In recent years we witness again an upward trend in the use of
overtime hours, now connected with labour shortages all around.
Temporary Reduced Hours
Temporary reduced hours (tijdelijk korter werken) arrangements in case of a severe shortfall
in business activity, not related to structural factors or normal business risks, does occur for
the purpose of maintenance of employment and experience (‘hoarding’) and offers workers
compensation through unemployment benefits (up to 100% of last earned wages). Recently,
TRH was applied to help slaughterhouses workers who were made redundant during the foot
and mouth disease in the spring of 2001. TRH can be used for six weeks, in exceptional cases
to be prolonged to six months. Restrictive legislation has made that this arrangement is much
less used than in for instance Germany. On an annual basis, less than 0.2 percent of the labour
force participates in TRH, with an average spell of 2.5 months, in total requiring less than one
percent of all the money spent on unemployment benefits (CPB 1997: 294-5).
Part-time Work
This discussion of working time reduction, flex-time and variation in hours, would not be
complete without considering the development of part-time employment and leave
arrangements. Part-time employment has been an effective measure of work-sharing in times
of high unemployment and strong labour force growth. Of the more than two million extra
jobs since 1983, at least 60 percent were part-time (less than 35 hours per week). The rising
share of part-time workers explains half of the average reduction of 14,5 working hours per
employee per year between 1989 and 1999 (OECD 2000, Table 2).
Currently, there are some 2,8 million part-time jobs (796,000 from 0-11 hours, 559,000 from
12-19 hours and 1,534,000 from 20-34 hours per week) (Table 7). During the 1980s the
growth of part-time employment accelerated in unison with the rise in female employment.
The female share in total employment soared from 25 percent in 1977 to 39 percent in 1999
(43 percent if marginal jobs are included). This increase is almost entirely due to married
women. The employment rate of married and cohabitating women between 30 and 50 years
doubled from 36 percent in 1985 to 74 percent in 1998. In 1973 one in ten mothers with
children in pre-school age (under six) worked outside the house for wages; in 1998 more than
half of these mothers did (CBS 1999). This is closely connected to the availability of the part-
time option (Visser 2000). In 1999 67 percent of all employed women worked part-time,
compared to 57 percent in 1985 and 45 percent in 1981. Among men there was a rise from
three percent in 1981 to seven percent in 1985 and 17 percent in 1999, a development17
reflecting the growth of part-time jobs among young people and students (Delsen 1998). Still,
part-time work is overwhelmingly a female affair. The female share in part-time employment
is 74.1 percent, compared to only 22.5 percent for full-time employment (Table 7). Only a
minority of Dutch women works full-time; they tend to be younger, unmarried, or married
without children, and have more education.
There exists a well-established view of part-time jobs as sub-standard jobs because of inferior
rights, entitlements, earnings or status, insufficient social security and pension coverage, and
lower career prospects (Meulders, Plasman and Plasman 1994). The full-time job is taken as
the norm by which to assess part-time jobs and the welfare of workers is evaluated only or
mainly on the basis of occupational status or earnings. Against this view Blossfeld and Hakim
(1997), Hakim (1999) and O’Reilly and Fagan (1998) have developed an alternative approach
in which they differentiate between types of part-time jobs, take account of gender roles and
position in the household, and allow for different work orientations and preferences of men
and women. There is a large difference between small and large part-time jobs, and between
voluntary and involuntary part-time work. The quality of part-time jobs relative to full-time
jobs, in terms of earnings and entitlements, tends to be higher if part-time employment is
driven by supply rather than demand and if the choice to work part-time is made by workers
already in employment, i.e. when these are ‘retention’ part-time jobs (Tilly 1991).
Table 7: Employment by status, type of contract, working-time, and sex, in 1999
total male female total male female
x 1000
share of
women in % in %
all (>=12 hours) 6,805 4,121 2,684 39.4
self-employed 733 497 235 32.1 10.8 12.1 8.8
employees 6.072 3,624 2,449 40.3 89.2 87.9 91.2
standard contract 5,502 3,369 2,133 38.8 90.6 93.0 87.1
flexible contract 571 255 316 55.3 9.4 7.0 12,9
 0-11 hours (796) (279) (517) (64.9) (10.5) (6.3) (16.2)
12-19 hours 559 99 460 82.3 7.4 2.2 14.4
20-34 hours 1,534 370 1,164 75.9 20.2 8.4 36.4
total part-time 2,889 748 2,141 74.1 38.0 17.0 66.9
total full-time 4,712 3,653 1,060 22.5 62.0 83.0 33.1
grand total 7,601 4,401 3,200 62.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), The Hague, various publications and STATline (http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb)
In the Netherlands, part-time jobs are neither atypical nor flexible, though they have probably
increased the aggregate flexibility of the Dutch labour market.
9 From the employers’
perspective, part-time jobs may serve different purposes. A survey in 1991 showed that 60
percent of the firms judged part-time jobs as a means to meet extra demand; 30 percent saw
as the main benefit that they opened a new labour reservoir; 29 percent mentioned that part-
time work helped to match shorter working with longer business hours, while one in five
firms stressed that part-time jobs helped to limit costs related to overtime (SZW 1991).
                                                     
9 This is not a foregone conclusion, because flexibility in time-use is limited by the operating hours of schools,
nurseries, shops and government offices.18
Employees, when asked why they work part-time, mention study, social responsibilities
(family, childcare) or a preference for more leisure time (Kunnen et al. 1997).
Most part-time employees are covered by collective agreements and most part-time jobs (81
percent, compared to 91 percent for full-time jobs) are standard jobs of indeterminate length,
subject to full employment protection. Flexible part-time jobs are mostly those of very small
hours (0-11 hours weekly), located in catering, retailing and cleaning, and held by young
people (male and female), or re-entering women without formal education. 25 percent of all
young people in employment have a marginal part-time job. This is strongly related to the
explosion of secondary jobs taken up by students, which in turn is related to the expansion of
higher education and a decade of reduction of student grants.
The hypothesis that the hours threshold for ‘retention’ part-time jobs in the Netherlands lies
around 18-20 hours (i.e. half-time jobs), is confirmed by the statistic that flexible contracts is
just as unlikely (<10%) among part-time employees working 20-24 hours per week as among
full-time workers. Among those working 12-19 hours per week the incidence of flexible
contracts rises to 17 percent, in the 0-11 category it soars to 44 percent. Part-time employees,
especially those working in small part-time jobs, earn less, although recent research by
Tijdens (AIAS research report 2001) shows that in 2000 net hourly wages of female part-time
workers are higher than net hourly wages of female full-time workers. In 1995, median hourly
earnings of part-time employees stood at 69.8 percent (males) and 93.1 percent (females) of
median hourly earnings of full-time male and female employees. This reflected both the lower
seniority of part-time workers (especially among men) and the relative concentration of small
part-time jobs in low-pay service sectors, such as cleaning, retailing, and hotel and restaurants
(Evans et al., 2000).
10 Controlled for sector, occupation and seniority, earnings differentials
between full-time and part-time jobs have narrowed to seven percent in the private sector
(STAR, 1997). A troublesome finding from the International Adult Literacy Survey of 1994-
95 is that part-time employees tend to participate significantly less in job-related training than
full-time employees (OECD 2000). This finding should be corrected, however, for the fact




According to Eurostat, only six percent of mothers with children under the age of ten was
full-time employed in 1996—by far the lowest percentage in Europe. The average in the
European Union is 30 percent. The flipside is that 41 percent of Dutch women with children
under the age of ten worked part-time, nearly three times the European average. Panel data
conform the picture that Dutch women tend to switch from full-time to part-time jobs once
they have children (de Graaf and Vermeulen 1997; Kragt 1997; Wetzels 1999). In 1997 the
majority of women expecting their first child worked full-time. After childbirth, the share of
                                                     
10 Still, for women it was one of the smallest differentials, after Italy (where part-time work is hardly developed),
but before Germany (87.5%), Belgium (86.8%), Spain (84.0%), France (81.7%), the UK (69.6%) and the US
(62.5%).
11 If we combine formal education and job-related training, we discover that older workers are most
disadvantaged; the training gap between younger and older workers is very large in the Netherlands, as is the
case in France and Germany, much larger than in the ‘high skill – high training’ economies of Sweden and
Denmark, or in the ‘low skill – little training’ economies of the UK and the US (OECD 1999).19
women with full-time jobs decreased to fifteen percent. 60 percent switched to a part-time
job, while 25 percent stopped. Unlike the pattern (uniquely?) found in Sweden (Anxo and
Storrie 2001), few Dutch women return to full-time jobs when the children grow older
(Dekker et al. 2001). Whether this is because women, after shifting from full-time to part-
time, do not want to work (again) fulltime hours, or cannot find full-time jobs is not known.
Recent legislation, effective from July 2000 (see below), has introduced an individual right to
choose longer or shorter working hours. Under conditions of full employment, this should
help preferences to show.
The choice for part-time jobs by women, or young parents, is constrained by the absence or
presence of facilities for family services and childcare. Enrolment in elementary schools
begins at the age of four. By its own admission, the Dutch welfare state ranked in 1996 lower
than most European welfare states in terms of provisions and services supporting young
families (SZW 2000; confirmed by rankings in Daly 2000; Korpi 2000; Rostgaard and
Fridberg 1998.) Only eight percent of children under the age of three have a place in
nurseries, day schools or crèches with long opening hours, compared to, for instance, 48
percent in Denmark (Rubery 2001, Table 4.17). Dutch parents, and in particular mothers,
assume a much larges share of household burdens than in the Scandinavian countries and this
is one main feature in which the Dutch ‘Social Democratic’ welfare state model deviates from
its Northern variants (Esping-Andersen 1999; Korpi 2000; Lewis 1992).
The Dutch Central Planning Bureau has come to the conclusion that the lack of childcare
facilities is becoming a constraint in labour force and economic growth. Demand for childcare
grew in 1970s but it took until 1987 before unions, under pressure of their female members,
began to demand childcare facilities in collective agreements (Tijdens, van der Lippe and de
Ruijter 2000). The Centre-Left government (1989-1993) introduced subsidies for childcare
facilities, so as to promote female labour participation. Companies could qualify for subsidies
or tax rebates. The alternative – more and longer arrangements for paid leave – hardly played
a role. Paid leave arrangements were rare. A right to unpaid parental leave (13 weeks full-
time, or six months part-time) was introduced in 1991. Only in few sectors, mainly in the
public services, is leave compensated, usually at 70 percent of earnings.
The growth of day-care places notwithstanding, supply lags demand by a large margin and
waiting lists are common. In 1998 the second of the two Lib-Lab cabinets (1994-1998, 1998-)
decided to double the day-care places to 150,000, but a shortage of staff prevents rapid
expansion. A new bill, guaranteeing ten days of paid leave per year in order to meet
emergencies or provide care, has been introduced to Parliament in 2001.
IV. Negotiated change and corporatist industrial relations
Part-time, flex-time and flexible work arrangements are an important ingredient of the Dutch
employment miracle (Auer 2000; Bosch 2001; Schmid 1997; Visser and Hemerijck 1997).
The ‘miracle’ was consolidated through a process of ‘negotiated change’ between unions,
employers and legislators, even though its basis lies in pressures from below, with a strong
element of ‘spontaneous’ or non-negotiated (at least not collectively negotiated) flexibility
offered by, and required from, women in a society which moved halfway from a breadwinner20
to a two-earner households economy.
Negotiated flexibility in the Netherlands involved all four dimensions distinguished above,
though not at the same time: wages, time, and contracts, and less, later and indirectly, tasks or
functional flexibility. Thus, the changes in the Dutch labour market – increasing its overall
flexibility and expanding the size of transitional labour markets by inducing more people to
enter or stay in the labour market, even when assuming other tasks and responsibilities  – can
be related to the politics of voluntary wage moderation starting in the early 1980s. Wage
moderation was tied to a collective work-sharing strategy with help of various forms of
working-time reduction, tax exemptions and subsidised employment. The two union
campaigns for working time reduction (1982-1985 and 1993-1996) led to shorter average
working hours and to de-standardisation, partly through the rapid diffusion of part-time work,
partly through a negotiated policy of flexibility and annualisation of working hours. The
increased use of part-time and flexible jobs has encouraged the trade unions to seek better
protection for this group (‘re-regulation’) in exchange for somewhat less protective rules for
core workers on standard employment contracts (‘de-regulation’), adopting a more procedural
and self-regulatory approach to working-time and employment protection issues (Wilthagen
1998). Similarly, in the 1990s Dutch trade unions, with support from the government and,
occasionally, from central employers’ organizations, have chosen a strategy of
‘normalisation’ of part-time work, trying to diminish the differences, in pay, standards, and
status, between part-time and full-time work (Visser 2000). Dutch trade unions have engaged
in these trade-offs in an attempt to favour ‘internal’ and ‘active’ flexibility over ‘external’ and
‘passive’ flexibility (see above, Table 1). As a part of that approach they have generally
fought against employers’ initiatives to increase the scope for pay flexibility, especially where
that implies the tying of workers’ earnings to individual or team efforts, or company profits.
Finally, skill-upgrading, training, broader task profiles, and functional flexibility have
received more attention in recent years under the impact of skill shortages and the tight labour
market. Before discussing the politics and policies of negotiated flexibility with regard to
working hours, part-time work and flexicurity in the next paragraph, I shall first present a
brief sketch of the scenery in Dutch industrial relations.
In the international literature the Netherlands has been labelled as democratic corporatist
(Crouch, 1993; Katzenstein, 1985; Van Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996). In response to its
dependency upon exports, the imperative of competitiveness and the inability to exert control
over external events, it developed tightly-knit networks of consultative bodies at the national
level, oriented towards the advancement of economic and social progress, and the
preservation of social peace. Through a range of national joint bodies, the umbrella
organisations of employers and unions are involved in concertation and social partnership,
between them and with the state. The corporatist consultation economy (in Dutch:
overlegeconomie) was reorganized after 1945 and has had its ups and downs since. After a
very successful initial period it went through a difficult and contentious phase in the 1970s,
but did recover in the 1980s and is again celebrated in the 1990s (Visser and Hemerijck,
1997).
The post-war consultation machinery was prepared during the last phase of the war in illegal
meetings between union leaders and employers. Their first decision was to create the
Foundation of Labour (Stichting van de Arbeid), a joint body under private law with equal21
representation of unions and employers. The Foundation is the main seat for the preparation
of joint opinions and central agreements, such as the Wassenaar agreement of 1982, the New
Course agreement of 1993, or the Flexibility and Security agreement of 1996 (Visser, 1998).
It is also the principle seat for consultations over macroeconomic policy and budget issues
between the social partners and the Cabinet, taking place twice every year. The other main
institution is the Social-Economic Council (Sociaal Economische Raad, SER), a tri-partite
organisation, of the social partners and government-appointed experts, founded in 1950 under
public law as the apex of a three-tiered (national, sectoral, company) system of consultation.
Until 1995, when Parliament withdrew this prerogative, advice from the council in matters of
social and economic legislation was mandatory. Practice, however, has not changed and the
SER has regained some of its former influence by producing quicker, and more unanimous,
advice. The SER has also supervisory tasks, for instance over the works councils.
The Works Council Act of 1979 (changed from earlier versions in 1950 and 1971) provides
for mandatory works councils elected by and from employees, independent from employers
and endowed with significant powers of information, consultation and, in restricted matters,
co-determination (Visser, 1995). The current law (last changed in 1997) applies to
establishments of 50 and more staff in both the private and public sector, except in schools
and in the military. In small firms the law mandates two annual consultation meetings with
staff. Though barred from wage negotiations, the councils have a large role in company
restructuring and an enhanced role in the management of working-time under the Working
Time Act of 1996 (see below) and the New Course agreement of 1993.
State involvement in industrial relations had been considerable through regulation of wage
setting (until 1962 wages had been set by a government-appointed Board of Mediators, after
consultation with unions and employers and controls continued in the public and subsidised
sector until the 1980s), statutory minimum wages (introduced in 1969), and a considerable
body of legislation on information and consultation rights of workers (see above), on working
hours (under the act of 1919, changed in 1996), health and safety in workplaces, and equal
opportunity (introduced in the 1970s and expanded since under the impact of European
Community law). Legislation on union (and employer) representation is light and there is no
law regulating strikes or lockouts.
Collective bargaining is framed under the law of 1927, which determines that collective
agreements overrule individual contracts and must be applied to all comparable workers in
the same firm or industry (erga omnes). Employers are not under obligation to negotiate with
trade unions and there are no recognition rules for unions, except that they must register, have
independent means and declare socio-economic aims. Under the law of 1937, the Minister
may extend a collective agreement and declare some or all of its clauses binding on
employers in the same sector. Extension does not affect firms that have negotiated a company
agreement and can only occur if, the signatory parties demand extension and the agreement
for which they ask extension covers 55-60 percent of the sector’s employees.
Two more laws of relevance for tripartite bargaining between unions, employers and
governments are the 1970 Wage Act (changed in 1987) and the Minimum Wage Adjustment
Act (revised in 1992). The Wage Act of 1970 abolished the Board of State Mediators, which
was bound by wage guidelines issued by the Minister of Social Affairs, and handed the22
responsibility for wage setting back to unions and employers. The government retains
however the power to order a temporary wage stop or impose a ceiling on wages if the
economic situation does in its view justify such a step. Following the 1973 oil shock several
statutory measures occurred, following the failure of unions and employers to reach
agreement over voluntary wage restraint. After the success of the bipartite central agreement
of Wassenaar at the end of 1982, wage bargaining has been free of government intervention.
In recognition of the new policies of unions and employers, and in agreement with the
deregulatory preferences of the then Centre-Right government (1982-1986 and 1986-1989),
the revised Wage Act of 1987 further restricts the conditions of government intervention to
really dire economic circumstances. Although the government did prepare an intervention in
1993, in order to speed up the adjustment of (union) negotiations to the changed conditions
after the EMS crisis and ensuing European recession, most observers agree that this would
not have stood the test of law, and that Dutch unions and employers have gained what the
Germans call Tarifautonomie.
The other legal shadow over the bargaining table is the national minimum wage, introduced
in 1969.
12 The minimum wage was initially determined on the same basis as public sector
wages, but new legislation since 1980 (revised in 1992) has made upward adjustment, in step
with private sector wage developments, contingent on a decline of the dependency rate, i.e. a
rise in the ratio of persons depending on benefits to persons in paid employment. From 1995
the dependency ratio has indeed decreased and minimum wages have been fully indexed to
contractual wage rises. The same applies to social benefits like old age pensions and social
assistance, the calculation of which is based on the minimum wage. Between 1983 and 1989,
and between 1992 and 1994, indexation had been suspended, causing a significant real and
relative decline in minimum wages, cushioned for the so-called ‘real’ minima and the poor by
special measures of Parliament.
13  The number of adult workers receiving the minimum wage
has decreased from twelve percent in 1983 to two percent in the mid 1990s. Nearly all
collective agreements guarantee wages above the statutory minimum.
Today, the 1937 extension law, mentioned before, casts only a fading shadow over the
bargaining table. In 1994 the (outgoing) Christian Democratic Labour Minister, encouraged
by advisors from the OECD, the Economics Ministry and the Central Bank, proposed to drop
this piece of legislation. This threat encouraged unions and employers to defend the extension
mechanism by allowing more flexibility in its application, for instance by exempting starting
firms and introducing lower ‘entry level’ wage scales for young and inexperienced workers.
Such a game of threats and improved self-regulation is not untypical for the Dutch model. In
this case, the incoming (Social Democratic) Labour Minister withdrew the proposals from his
predecessor. 
14
Around 11 percent of all Dutch employees are covered by extended agreements, in addition to
                                                     
12 Youth minimum wages, introduced in 1974, begin, at age 16, at the level of 60% of the adult minimum wage,
reached at age 23.
13 The real value of the minimum wage, expressed as percentage of the average wage, decreased from 64.4% in
1980 to 54.6% in 1990 and 51.1% in 1996 (Roorda and Vogels, 1997).
14 Research by Freeman, Hartog and Teulings (1994) showed, moreover, that extension had a negligible effect
on wages.23
some 70 percent who are directly covered one of the 800 company agreements (covering 15%
of all employees) or one of the 200 industry agreements (covering 55%) (Hartog 1999). The
number of company agreements has doubled in 25 years, whereas the number of industry
agreements is stable. In the 1990s coverage appears to have increased from 71 to 80 percent
(Traxler 1994; Visser 2001), partly as an effect of the inclusion of the public sector and the
establishment of multi-employer bargaining units in (subsidised) social and personal
services.
15 This offsets the slight tendency towards increased single-employer bargaining in
industry and commercial services. However, sectoral or multi-employer bargaining remains
dominant and the recent trend towards decentralisation takes mostly the form of framework
bargaining, allowing more local variation, especially on working-time.
Since the recent merger of four unions in services, transport and industry, the largest union in
the market sector, FNV Allies, negotiates as many as 700 agreements.
16 Bargaining is
conducted under the supervision of appointed union officials, though in most unions the
results are subject to membership ballots. This ensures a high degree of horizontal
coordination across bargaining units, in addition to the role of peak federations and central-
level concertation  (Van den Toren 1996). Most companies of significant size (50 and more
staff) are member of one or more employers’ associations and nearly all, even when they sign
their own collective agreement with the unions, are assisted by advisors from one major
employer organisation, the General Employers Federation VNO-NCW (AWVN, Algemene
Werkgevers Vereniging). This association is affiliated with the main peak association VNO-
NCW, with which it is currently preparing a merger. VNO-NCW itself was in 1995 formed
from a merger between the general (VNO) and Christian (NCW) confederations. It is the
undisputed representative of Dutch business, except in agriculture and in the small and
medium-sized firm sector, where there are other highly representative peak associations.
VNO-NCW counts nearly all sectoral employers’ associations (some 150) of importance
among its affiliates and allows for individual membership of large multi-national companies
such as Philips, Shell, AKZO or Unilever.
In all, the organization rate of Dutch firms, measured by the size of their staff, is estimated at
a stable 80 percent (Visser 2001). It is only in sectors with many small firms (construction,
retailing) or many new entrants (TWA’s, professional services, cleaning and security
business, computer and organizational specialists) that employer organizations are weak and
not fully representative for the sector. This may then be a hindrance to the ‘self-regulatory’
approach to employment protection, labour time regulation and social security (occupational
pensions), which is so much appreciated by Dutch employers as an alternative to legislation.
With the exception of construction, unions are weak in these very sectors (see Table 8). On
aggregate, Dutch workers are not highly unionised. The current density rate lies around 25
percent, which is below the European Union average (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). As one
                                                     
15 After an experimental phase (1983-92), following severe cutbacks and stand-still in public sector pay, salaries
and other terms of employment of government employees have since 1993 been negotiated in eight sectors
(policy, education, central government etc.) between the unions and public authorities. Free collective bargaining
had been restored in the subsidised and government regulated sector (health, private schools, railways, etc.) from
1985.
16 In the pluralist union system of the Netherlands ‘common table bargaining’ is the rule and in most cases this
union is joined by a Christian and a senior staff union when negotiating with employers.24
can see from Table 8, among female and part-time workers, but especially among young and
flexible workers, trade unions are underrepresented.
Table 8: Union density rates, in 1997
female parttime youth flexible
all 25 20 21 12 10
working week 35 hours and more 31 .. .. .. ..
20-34 hours 25 .. .. .. ..
12-19 hours 13 .. .. .. ..
0-11 hours 3 .. .. .. ..
tenure longer than 5 years 31 .. .. .. ..
less than 5 years 12 .. .. .. ..
sectors manufacturing 31 16 25 13 10
construction 41 .. .. 30 ..
retail and wholesome trade 14 10 9 7 6
hotels and restaurants 17 16 12 .. ..
transport and communication 39 22 29 17 ..
financial services 19 16 21 .. ..
business services 14 11 13 .. ..
public administration 45 32 32 33 ..
education and research 43 41 40 .. 22
health and welfare services 24 22 21 9 9
recreational / cultural services 26 23 23 17 ..
sources: Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000: Tables NE.D and NE.E, and Visser and Van Rij 1999.
After the troublesome decade of the 1980s, the 1990s have been reasonably kind to the Dutch
trade unions. Between 1979 and 1987 union membership fell by some 20 per cent, while 20-
25 percent of the remaining union members were retired, unemployed or depending on
benefits, and density declined from 35 to 25 percent. In the 1990s union membership
increased every year except in 2000, though increases were just enough to keep pace with
employment growth and aggregate density stayed more or less put at 25 percent. The
strongest rise in membership came from women and union density of women increased from
13 to 20 percent in fifteen years (whereas male density decreased). Union density among
workers in longer (half-time and more) part-time jobs also increased, but among workers in
flexible (and TWA) jobs the unions have hardly made headway, and among young people
unions have nearly disappeared (Visser and Van Rij 1999). The lower female and part-time
unionisation rate is only in part related to the sectoral distribution. Female and part-time
employment is widespread both in ill-unionised sectors such as retailing and catering, and in
unionised sectors like education and public administration. However, the incidence of small
part-time and flexible jobs tends to be much higher in retailing and catering.
The main Dutch union confederation is the Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions, FNV,
which emerged from a merger between the social-democratic and the Catholic union currents
in the 1981  (prepared by a federation in 1976). It organises in all industries and occupations,
both in the private and public sector, and attracts two-thirds of all union members in the
country. Two other confederations are the Christian Trade Union Confederation (CNV) and a25
Union Centre for Senior and Middle-ranking Staff (MHP). All three centres are member of
the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and cooperate in negotiations with
employers and in consultations with the government. Membership may be low, but the
approval rate of Dutch unions is rather high. Evidence from survey research (Klandermans
and Visser 1995) shows that over 60 percent of all employees (strongly) agree with the view
that ‘trade unions offer a positive contribution to society’ and over 70 percent with the view
that unions ‘are necessary institutions for the protection of collective employee interests’.
V. The Politics and Policies of Negotiated Flexibility
In November 1982 the central organizations of trade unions and employers concluded,
unexpectedly, a central agreement. This agreement of Wassenaar is generally seen as the
beginning of a new era in Dutch labour relations (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). The trade
unions offered wage restraint and employers’ organizations lifted the veto against a general
round of working-time reduction. The agreement itself mentioned various options for work
sharing, including early retirement and part-time employment.
The Wassenaar agreement was only a recommendation, but one that carried authority. To help
investment and employment, negotiators in sectors and firms were advised to forsake price
indexation and use the savings for a cost-neutral reduction of working hours. Like the
government, employers recognized that working-time reduction was a price worth to be paid.
Although negotiations over shorter working hours proved cumbersome, in less than a year
two-thirds of all collective agreements were renewed, mostly for two years, during which the
payment of price compensation was suspended and most workers gained a 5% reduction of
working time. Average real wages fell by nine percent in real terms (Visser 1989).
The strict exchange rate policy exerted discipline on wage developments, while wage
moderation, in turn, enabled the Dutch Central Bank to stick credibly to its non-inflationary
policy. Low inflation allowed unions to forget about automatic price indexation. The new mix
of macroeconomic policy and wage setting also changed the institutional relations climate and
the relations with the state (Hemerijck, Van der Meer and Visser 2000). The new pattern
became a central dialogue about a wide range of policy issues combined with sectoral wage
bargaining, based on the primacy of industrial self-regulation. The role of the central
organizations was confined to redirecting sectoral contracting towards tacit, economy-wide
wage restraint and introducing a range of new issues and topics on the agenda of bargainers.
Since 1983 some 100  agreements, recommendations and joint opinion have been issued, on
issued ranging from the rights and job opportunities of ethnic minorities, the position of part-
timers or flex-workers, to the reform of the pension system. The fruits of this new approach
became visible in the 1990s. I shall try to illustrate this with regard to three important
regulatory issues central to the problematic of this chapter: part-time employment, working
time, and flexicurity.
Part-time employment
With regard to part-time employment, Dutch trade unions initially shared the sceptical view
of other European unions. Cook (1984: 9) noted that there was a ‘widespread unwillingness
of unions to deal with part-time work and its problems’. Only in Sweden ‘part-time work (has26
been treated) as an acceptable element of labour market policy’, mainly because its
development was located in the public sector and took the form of well-protected halftime
jobs. But even in Sweden ‘feminist opponents of part-time work argued that only full-time
earners can be equal to their spouses and that the acceptance of part-time work locks women
into the responsibility for family work’ (Qvist et al. 1984: 276). These were exactly the
arguments used by Dutch feminists at the time. In their view, part-time employment would
perpetuate the unequal division of paid and unpaid labour between men and women (Bruyn-
Hundt 1983). In 1981 the main union federation published a position paper in which the
inferiority of employment protection, wages and career prospects in part-time jobs and the
lack of union membership among part-timers was highlighted. The union did not want to help
creating a secondary and non-unionised job market (FNV 1981). At this time, during a deep
recession, like their European counterparts, Dutch unions wanted work-sharing through a
collective reduction of working hours from 40 to 36 hours per week, to be realised in 1985
and with full wage compensation. Dutch employers were opposed and advertised, in stead,
part-time work as a form of individual working time reduction with a proportionate cut in pay
(RCO 1980). The unions saw this as an attempt to undermine their collective work-sharing
strategy.
The labour supply decisions of (married) women were driven by the recession rather than by
union policies or feminist preferences. As was noted before, in the early 1980s women shifted
from part-period to part-time participation. Fewer women took the chance of temporarily
withdrawing from the labour market and more women tried to retain their jobs, possibly
through reduced hours when faced with the need to combine work and motherhood.
Paradoxically, these supply forces agreed with decreasing labour demand, especially in the
public sector. Collective sector managers in local government, health and education, faced
with austerity measures of the central government, welcomed demands from women who
wanted to switch from full-time to part-time jobs as an alternative to painful dismissals
(Tijdens 1998).
During the entire 1980s the union controversy between collective working-time reduction and
part-time work continued (van Eijl 1997). The reference group for the collective working
hours campaign was the male breadwinner, for part-time jobs it was the working mother. By
the end of the decade when in a number of sectors (education and health in particular) these
groups became equally large, a compromise solution emerged. Around 1990 the male
breadwinner had lost its once dominant position in the Dutch labour market. Surveys showed
that, with some delay, he was loosing terrain in the unions too. In 1993 44 percent of all adult
union members were member of dual earners households (Klandermans and Visser 1995). At
this time, women’s groups in the unions moved away from the negative view of part-time
work that had united feminists a decade earlier. In the 1980s and 1990s a rather active female
lobby became focal, especially in the public service union, the teachers’ union, the food
workers’ union and the FNV federation. These women abandoned the five days - five hours
model for men and women that had been championed by feminists in the 1970s. Traffic
congestion and services, available only during daytime outside weekends, made an extra day-
off more valuable. In 1990 the FNV abandoned the norm of the standard full-time working
day and slowly but surely moved towards embracing diversity and choice, combined with a
‘right to work part-time’ for men and women, and equal rights for part-time workers
(Sprenger and Passchier 1998). This was ‘the harvest of years of investment of women in the27
union movement’ (Grunell 1997: 101).
The fact that, in contrast to the situation in many European countries, part-time work in the
Netherlands is mostly voluntary, helps explain the singular position of the Dutch unions in the
European union spectrum. In Eurostat surveys, the Netherlands shows as the country with the
lowest share of involuntary part-time work (Rubery et al. 1999, table 7.5). According to
Eurobarometer data, analysed by Schulze Buschoff (1999), part-time work is evaluated more
positively by Dutch women than by their sisters elsewhere in Europe (with the exception of
Denmark) as regards contractual status, tenure, perceived career chances, job satisfaction and
social security, though on all these aspects part-time jobs attract lower scores than full-time
jobs even in the Netherlands. In the 1990s the new union approach gained support from the
government, which saw the promotion of part-time jobs as a contribution to their newly
discovered objective of an active welfare state based on increased labour market participation
(Visser and Hemerijck 1997).
In a surprisingly brief spell of time, the part-time issue has conquered a place on the agenda of
collective bargainers (Sloep 1996). This shows the comparative advantage of co-ordinated
bargaining: if central organizations agree on a particular agenda, their influence on legislators
and on local bargainers is relatively large. Moreover, in the Dutch consultation economy, the
central organizations, especially employers, have an incentive to stay ahead of legislation. That
way they hope to wield more influence over the regulations that be, and to demonstrate their
importance to member organizations and firms.
In 1989 the Foundation of Labour published a ‘joint opinion’ and four years later a major
agreement was reached, pre-empting legislation. Noting that part-time employment had
increased rapidly in past years, the social partners agreed that ‘it ought to be prevented that
this development comes to a halt’, something that ‘might happen if part-time work remains
concentrated in a limited number of sectors and jobs, or if small part-time jobs produces too
limited income and career prospects’. The Foundation recommended that collective
bargainers shall improve standards and that firms recognise a qualified right for full-time
employees to work reduced hours, unless this cannot reasonably be granted on grounds of
conflicting business interests (STAR 1993). From 1990 to 1996 the percentage of firms with
a part-time clause in the collective agreement increased from 23 to 70 percent (STAR 1997).
Yet, FNV criticised that too few firms had fully adopted the Foundation’s recommendation.
In some sectors waiting lists for employees who wanted to work part-time appeared (Tijdens
1998). An initiative Bill to institute a statutory right to work part-time was narrowly rejected
by Parliament in 1996, but new proposals resulted in legislation effective from July 2000.
Workers who have been employed during one year or longer are entitled to demand a
reduction or increase of their working hours with 20 percent. Employers must consent unless
clear business reasons, given in writing, motivate a refusal (lack of replacement in the case of
a reduction, lack of work or business in the case of an increase of hours). Small firms (with
less than 10 employees) are excluded, but the law covers employees working abroad for
Dutch firms.
Accepting and promoting part-time work, trade unions have had some success in narrowing
the differences in job and social security rights between part-time and full-time workers.
Government policy has worked in the same direction. The social security reforms of the28
1980s, intended to bring greater austerity and conforming to European legislation, ended the
formal discrimination of married women in three major schemes—disability (1980), national
old age pension (1985) and extended unemployment benefits (1987). As a rule, part-time
workers pay pro rata social insurance contributions in exchange for pro rata entitlements. In
comparison to many other countries, the Dutch social security laws are rather favourable to
part-time workers (SZW 1995). The main principle of entry into the system is the
employment contract, regardless of working time. Coverage for health insurance is also
relatively easy for part-time workers. Moreover, the National Old Age Pension Act provides
every citizen with a flat-rate old age pension by the age of 65, irrespective of previous
employment or earnings. Entitlements have been individualised (covering about 40% of
average wages but increasing to 70% for minimum wage earners) and are based on
citizenship rather than employment, which is the system in which part-timers fare best (Ginn
and Arber 1998). Workers can top up their pensions through earnings related and capital
funded pension funds of which there are about 1,000 in the Netherlands. As from 1994 part-
time workers with small jobs can no longer be excluded from participation in these pension
funds. In 1996, 91% of all Dutch workers were covered by occupational pensions, which,
when fully matured, guarantee 70% of (last-earned or average) earnings. The ‘white spots’,
without coverage, are seasonal workers, young people and women working small part-time
and flexible jobs in low pay occupations (Rein 2001). The 1990 tax reform reduced the basic
tax allowance for breadwinners and integrated social security charges, thus lowering
disincentives for second earners to take up more hours (Gustafsson and Bruyn-Hundt 1991).
The 2001 tax reform will remove the remaining shared taxation components.
Statutory minimum wages help to narrow wage differentials, in particular between men and
women, and between full-time and part-time workers, for whom the minimum is more
important  (Blau and Kahn 1996; Roorda and Vogels 1997). The 1/3 rule, under which
employees working less than one-third of full-time hours were denied coverage under the
national minimum wage (and holiday payments) law, was repealed in 1993. Similar
exclusionary clauses in collective agreements became unlawful under the 1994 Act against
discrimination based on differences in working hours. Traditionally, fringe benefits and
premium pay for overtime had been structured around full-time thresholds. In most collective
agreements negotiators have agreed to remove or reconsider these thresholds. Still, unions
and employers are locked into a dispute regarding overtime payment. While the unions favour
overtime rates if part-timers work extra hours on grounds of ‘equal treatment’, employers
offer normal rates if the extra hours fall in daytime working hours on grounds of ‘equal pay’.
This dispute may loose its significance, however, with the further differentiation and
individualisation of working hours.
Working time
In the 1990s the union campaign for a 36 hours working week produced a small success. By
1998 about half of the employees gained a contractual average working week of 36 hours. But
its largest impact was on the greater variability and variation in working hours during the year
and across workers. De-standardisation is supported by collective agreements, negotiated
since the ‘New Course’ central agreement of 1993, favouring working time reduction and
decentralisation of decision making over working time, with more direct involvement of
workers.29
Representing a more diversified membership than ten years earlier, union leaders stepped back
from seeking a standard solution and went along with the new trend towards decentralisation
and individualisation. In the 1994-96 bargaining rounds various pressures came together
(Tijdens, 1998). In capital-intensive industries employers wanted longer operating hours.
Just-in-time production, reduction of stocks and traffic congestion pushed in the direction of
shift work and longer ‘normal’ daytime working hours, allowing a reduction of overtime pay
rates related to ‘unsocial’ hours. Workers, in general, wanted more freedom in determining
when to start or end the working day and avoid traffic peak hours, or get the kids from school.
Married women and mothers, although preferring part-time over full-time jobs, preferred
(larger) part-time jobs and more control over their hours of work, and fathers and mothers
wanted extra time as well as more time control in order to meet emergencies at home. More
workers wanted to vary working hours during the year or during the life cycle, with extended
breaks, or the possibility to save time for sabbaticals or early retirement.
Surveys of union members showed that there was considerable support for increased
flexibility in time-arrangements and collective agreements (Visser and Van Rij 1999). In so-
called à la carte agreements, employees have the right to swap time for money, or money for
time, within certain limits. Initially, the unions had resisted such innovations, fearing that the
solidarity of work-sharing would be undermined since they did trust their own surveys,
showing that their members would rather buy than sell leisure time. After the first hesitant,
but positive, experiments, the unions now support these developments towards more
individual choice within collective agreements and FNV Allies, the main union in the market
sector, expects that 70-90 percent of future agreements will contain such clauses.
These developments are supported by recent legislation. Existing restrictions on shop licences
and opening hours have been loosened or devolved to local authorities. Shopping and
working during weekends and at Sundays has become more common. Occasionally, the
unions join the Christian opposition parties in parliament and the Churches in token protests
against Sunday work and the harried world of the 24 hours economy, but they are not very
determined or consistent about it. Replacing legislation of 1919, the 1996 Labour Time Act
sets wider margins for maximum working hours, weekend and night work, and allows
deviation from statutory norms, within certain boundaries, if there are formal consultations
with the unions, the works council, or staff representatives (de Lange 1999). In these matter,
the works councils, mandatory in firms of 50 and more staff, have gained a limited right to
negotiate. In its preamble, the Act considers that in a ‘dual earners economy’, employees must
be able to combine work and care, and therefore find variable and personal solutions in
matters of working time.
The current government has presented a Framework Bill on ‘Employment and Care’ to
Parliament. The bill want to harmonize different forms of leave and introduces a new right of
ten days ‘care leave’ per year. Employers are lobbying hard to defeat this bill; their alternative
is a proposal to have the unions sign a Framework Agreement containing more sectoral
flexibility. With regard to early retirement, most of the older arrangements have now been
changed through collective bargaining in individual or collective time saving and pre-
pensioning arrangements, with additional insurance. They tend to make part-time exits more
attractive and delay full early retirement (SCP 2001).30
Flexicurity
In 1995 unions and employers signed the first collective agreement for temp workers,
employed by TWA’s, introducing a right of continued employment and pension insurance
after four consecutive contracts or 24 months of service. This prepared the ground for the
central agreement on ‘Flexibility and Security’ of 1996, which, in turn, paved the way for an
overhaul in 1999 of Dutch law on protection against dismissals . This “flexicurity” law
(Wilthagen 1998) is a compromise, not just between employers and employees, but also
within the unions between workers with and without stable jobs. A relaxation of statutory
dismissal protection for regular employment contracts is exchanged for an improvement in
the rights of temporary workers and the introduction of a ‘presumption of an employment
relation’ in the case of freelance work and ‘subcontracting’ self-employment. After three
temporary contracts, without interruption, any new assumption will be permanent. The market
for TWA employment is further liberalized and job agencies do no longer need a license.
However, the employment role of TWA’s is strengthened and under the new law they are
held responsible for social protection of temporary workers in case of illness, disability or
unemployment when contracts have been renewed several times. The law incentives
collective agreements for flexible workers, allowing social partners to negotiate their own
rules (allowing upward and downward deviation from legal norms). Flexible workers gain
access to social benefits on the basis of the average hours worked  and any ‘call’ will count
for a minimum of three working hours even if no hours are worked. In a number of collective
agreements such norms already exist (restaurants: three hours per day, construction: six hours,
in some industry agreements the minimum ‘call’ is 18 hours or a half-day week) (Van Bolhuis
1996: 22).
Employers need a permit from the director of the regional employment office before they can
give notice to terminate a standard employment contract. This system of ‘permits’ has been
criticised as a burden on business and a source of rigidity. Yet, empirical research hardly
supports these charges. In 85 percent of all dismissal requests, a permit is given, although
special clauses for older workers and in case of sickness may create considerable delays.
Filing a request to terminate the employment contract at the lower district court on grounds of
‘serious cause’ increasingly circumvents the formal permit system. In that case the issue is
settled with a pay compensation or severance payment, usually one month for every year
worked. In 1996 there were 60,436 permits for terminating employment filed at the regional
employment office, against 44,426 settlements in court, a ratio of 1.4 to 1. In 1990 the ratio
had been 6 (permits) to 1 (court), in 1986 14 to one (Wilthagen 1998). The new law has also
introduced an abbreviated dismissal procedure, but its use has so far been very limited.
VI. Conclusion
The Netherlands is moving from a single earner (breadwinner) to a dual or one-and-a-half
earner (part-time) economy. In 1975 about 85 percent of all married men between 15-64 were
sole breadwinners; in 1994 this proportion has dropped to one half. The one-and-a-half job
model is still gaining ground. This is of course no equality. In most cases the one-and-the-half
earner model means that the man works full-time, the women part-time. This shows up in
different incomes. Given this state of affairs, two radical different policy choices are possible
(Plantenga 1996). The first option is to push for reforms, which allow more women to31
participate on the labour market on the same terms as men. According to Plantenga (1996:
104) this means that ‘the same “care-less” participation behaviour employed by men is also
advocated for women without a clear answer how to tackle the work and responsibilities
normally associated with women’s lives’. In the second option ‘the perspective is turned
around. The stress is no longer on women to participate in the labour market in a “male” way,
but rather that men should participate in the labour market in a “female” way, ergo,
participating in care tasks’ (idem). It would seem that Dutch women – and gradually also
Dutch policy makers – are pushing the second option.
The various estimates of external flexibility do not suggest that the Netherlands is an outlier
compared with its European neighbours (Delsen 1995), but there is no doubt that the
phenomenon has been on the rise in recent times. It is impossible to say whether the decline
in 1999 indicates a trend reversal, possibly caused by the new ‘flexicurity’ legislation that
became effective early that year (see below), or that it is a temporary phenomenon related to
the current tight labour market. From data of Regional Labour Market Boards one has the
impression that in recent more young people and first entrants have been offered permanent
jobs (see De Lange and Thunissen 2000).
We note that flexible contracts are often chosen for lack of alternative, especially for people
with low skills or with limiting conditions (as in the case of single mothers or partially
disabled workers). These jobs offer little in terms of employment maintenance (income
sustainability and training) and where they alternate with extended spells of un- and non-
employment they forebode social exclusion. On the other hand, some forms of temporary
work and temp jobs, ease the entry of young people, and of the unemployed, into employment
and, by offering job experience, support their inclusion. As was mentioned before, more than
half of all persons in temporary jobs move on to permanent jobs. Disquieting, however, is that
in recent years flexible contracts (including TWA) accounts for 22 percent of the new cases of
disability, almost doubling the share of flexible jobs in total employment and suggesting that
the risk of disability is much higher in the case of flexible jobs.
For first entrants and the long-term unemployed one particular form of temporary jobs,
usually between six months and two years and paid at 100-120 percent of the statutory
minimum wage, exists since the mid-1990s. These ‘Melkert jobs’, named after the then
Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, are mainly created in the public (local
government) sector. From 1998 this job program was combined with the provisions under the
Youth Work Guarantee Plan in a national Job Seekers Reintegration Scheme (Wet
Inschakeling Werklozen, WIW 1998), which offers young job seekers and the long-term
unemployed a choice of a job, training or involvement in voluntary social activities. The size
of the program accounts for 1-1,5 percent of total employment. Evidence about the outflow
from these transitional positions into stable employment is scant and does not yet allow a
conclusion about the effectiveness of these measures in the struggle against social exclusion.
From existing surveys we may deduce that workers have strong preferences against both long
hours and very short hours; satisfaction levels rise for the middle working hours categories.
Dutch employees express more satisfaction with their working hours than is customary in
Europe and it is comforting to know that most part-time work in the Netherlands is
‘voluntary’ in the sense that most part-time employees actually prefer to work part-time. In
the 1997 Labour Force Survey only 5.5 percent of all part-time workers indicated that they32
wanted but could not find a full-time job. This was almost four times below the average of
19.7 percent for the European Union (Eurostat 1998: 138). There is however a consistent
preference for longer part-time hours among those working in small part-time jobs (Boelens
1997).
Our conclusion regarding part-time work in the Netherlands is that the rapid diffusion of this
option has served the purpose of inclusion, especially of women, students and unemployed
youth. For young people in employment and the long-term unemployed a wider range of
subsidised part-time (32 hours) jobs at or just above the statutory minimum wage  (which is
lower for young people) has become available in the 1990s. This is currently one of the main
planks of active labour market policy in the Netherlands Dutch (Salverda 1999; Visser and
Hemerijck 1997). The shift from part-period participation to part-time participation of
married women and (prospective) mothers occurred at a time of soaring unemployment and
served the purpose of employment maintenance. Staying in employment, but at reduced
hours, clearly was (perceived to be) the better option for maintaining employment and income
capacities, especially when the prospects of re-entrance worsened, or would anyhow be
associated with loss of human capital, experience and income (Wunderink-van Veen 1997).
However, this (second best?) choice was made against the background of lacking facilities for
childcare and family services, and the absence of leave arrangements. It was hardly an option
for women to continue in full-time jobs.
Finally, the part-time option for older men (and women) as an alternative to exclusion into
unemployment, disablement or early retirement has recently received more attention, for
instance through revision of early retirement schemes into flexible and fully funded pre-
pensioning schemes. The effect is shown in a rising employment rate of older men and
women.33
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